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Abstract. The claim that God is maximally present is characteristic of all 
three major monotheisms. In this paper, I  explore this claim with regard to 
Christianity. First, God’s omnipresence is a matter of God’s relations to all space 
at all times at once, because omnipresence is an attribute of an eternal God. In 
addition, God is also present with and to a person. The assumption of a human 
nature ensures that God is never without the ability to be present with human 
persons in the way mind-reading enables; and, in the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit, God is present in love.
INTroDuCTIoN
The claim that God is maximally present is characteristic of all three major 
monotheisms.1 In this paper, I want to explore this claim with regard to 
Christianity, which is the monotheism I know best. It is clear that there 
are various kinds of presence, for human beings as well as for God. For 
human beings, for example, being present can be a matter of being here 
now. Analogously, even for immaterial God, there is a kind of presence 
that involves relations to both space and time. The relations involved 
in presence with regard to space and time are typically characterized as 
presence in or presence at.
1 God’s omnipresence is the subject of an  increasing literature in contemporary 
philosophy. For a  representative excellent example, see Hud Hudson, ‘omnipresence’, 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, Thomas P. Flint and michael C. rea, eds. 
(oxford: oxford university Press, 2009), pp. 199-216. my focus in this paper is on a side 
of omnipresence not often investigated in the standard treatments of it.
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In addition, however, there is also the kind of second-personal 
presence that one human person can have to another. This is the kind of 
presence we have in mind when we say, for example,
‘She read the paper all through dinner and was never present to any 
of the rest of us’
or
‘He sat with me at the defendant’s table, but he was never really 
present with me during the trial.’
In these examples, there is presence at a time and in a place; but some kind 
of presence, characterized by one or another kind of second-personal 
psychological connection, is missing. Typically, this kind of presence is 
characterized as presence with or presence to another person. I will call 
this kind of presence ‘personal presence’.
Personal presence itself comes in different kinds. In mindreading 
and empathy, for example, there is a kind of personal presence that has 
something of the character that telepathy would have if telepathy were 
real, as it is not. In empathy, for example, one can feel within oneself 
another person’s pain, for example; in mind-reading more generally, one 
can somehow sense as internal to one’s own psychology another person’s 
intentions or emotions. When one person Paula mind-reads another 
person Jerome, Paula is in some sense there, present with Jerome.
This is a kind of unilateral personal presence, but mutual personal 
presence is also possible. It is mediated by a  certain kind of mutual 
awareness, of the kind that arises, for example, when two people lock 
eyes. mutual personal presence manifestly comes in degrees. There is the 
minimal kind that can arise when one catches the eye of a total stranger 
on a bus. At the other end of the scale, there is the kind of intense personal 
presence possible between those united through mutual love. In mind-
reading, one person somehow has within himself something of the mind 
of another. In mutual love between persons, there can be something 
stronger than such an asymmetrical relation; there can be a mutual ‘in-
ness’ between the persons united in love, in a way that yields powerful 
personal presence. We might call this ‘second-personal presence’.2
2 I have discussed the nature of the second-personal at length in my Wandering in 
Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (oxford: oxford university Press, 
2010), chapters 4 and 6. For an excellent contemporary attempt to explain the nature of 
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Since there is one mind and will in God, in our sense of ‘person’, 
God is a person too.3 And so it is in principle possible for God to have 
personal presence to or with human persons as well; and Christian 
theology emphasizes God’s desire for union in love with human 
persons. In what follows, I will argue that, on Christian doctrine, even 
the personal presence generated by mind-reading and empathy are 
possible for God. In addition, something analogous to mutual ‘in-ness’ 
is possible for God with respect to those who love him. but, for God, 
this ‘in-ness’ has an ontological reality that is not available in the case of 
mutually loving human beings. For lack of a better term, I will use an old 
theological term and refer to this most intimate and powerful kind of 
second-personal presence between God and a human person as God’s 
‘indwelling’ a human person.
In this paper, I will say something briefly about God’s presence with 
regard to time and space, and then I will focus on God’s personal presence 
to and with human persons through mind-reading and through God’s 
second-personal indwelling in those who love God.
PreSeNCe WITH reGArD To TIme
God’s presence with respect to time is formulated in the doctrine of 
eternity. Contrary to the way it is sometimes thought of, eternity is not 
just timelessness. rather it is a  mode of existence characterized both 
by the absence of succession and also by limitless duration. because 
an eternal God cannot have succession in his life, neither of the series 
(the so-called ‘A  series’ or ‘b series’) characteristic of time can apply 
to God’s life or to God’s relations with other things. That is, nothing in 
God’s life can be past or future with respect to anything else, either in 
God’s life or in time; and, similarly, nothing in God’s life can be earlier or 
later than anything else either.
on the other hand, because eternity is also limitless duration, God’s 
life consists in the duration of a present that is not limited by either future 
the second-personal in connection with child development, see Vasudevi reddy, How 
Infants Know Minds (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard university Press, 2008).
3 For a discussion of the ways in which a simple God can be considered a person, 
see my ‘Simplicity and Aquinas’s Quantum metaphysics’, ed. Gerhard Krieger, 2014; see 
also a shortened and revised version, ‘The Nature of a Simple God’, American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming.
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or past.4 Since the mode of existence of an eternal God is characterized 
by this kind of presentness, the relation between an  eternal God and 
anything in time has to be one of simultaneity. of course, the simultaneity 
associated with an eternal God cannot be temporal simultaneity. Taking 
the concept of eternity seriously involves recognizing that it introduces 
technical senses for several familiar words and phrases, including ‘now’ 
and ‘simultaneous with’, as well as for the present-tense forms of many 
verbs. The relations between eternity and time therefore require a special 
sense of ‘simultaneity’. In earlier work, Norman Kretzmann and I called 
this special sort of simultaneity ‘eT-simultaneity’, for ‘simultaneity 
between what is eternal and what is temporal’.5
The logic of the doctrine of eternity has the result that every moment 
of time, as that moment is now in time, is eT-simultaneous with the whole 
eternal life of God. or, to put the same point the other way around, the 
whole of eternity is eT-simultaneous with each temporal event as that 
event is actually occurring in the temporal now.
It helps in this connection to consider the question: ‘Does an eternal 
God know what time it is now?’ For the sake of discussion, suppose that, 
for things in time, there is an absolute temporal now, as distinct from 
a now that is merely relative to some particular temporal entity. Could 
an eternal God know what time the absolute temporal now is?
on the supposition that in time there is an  absolute now, then in 
time there is a  fact of the matter about how far history has unrolled. 
With regard to the inhabitants in time, at any given moment in time as 
that moment becomes the absolute now, history has unrolled that far. 
And this is something an eternal God can know. Furthermore, because 
the whole of eternity is eT-simultaneous with each temporal event as 
it is actually occurring in the absolute temporal now, for every time 
an eternal God can know all the events actually occurring at that time 
as well as the temporal location of that time and its being experienced as 
the absolute now by temporal entities at that time.
4 For detailed discussion of this doctrine, see Chapter 4 of my Aquinas (london and 
New York: routledge, 2003) and my ‘The openness of God: eternity and Free Will’, ed. 
ben Arbour, (forthcoming).
5 A  relationship that can be recognized as a  kind of simultaneity will of course 
be symmetric. but, since its relata have relevantly distinct modes of existence, eT-
simultaneity will be neither reflexive nor transitive. In particular, each of two temporal 
events can be eT-simultaneous with one and the same eternal event without being eT-
simultaneous with each other.
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but after these things, there is nothing further for God to know about 
what time it is now. There is no time in the eternal now; and, in the eternal 
now, God is present to every temporal event, as it is part of the absolute 
temporal now. In the life of an eternal God, no temporal moment has any 
more claim than any other to be for God the absolute now.
one crude but helpful heuristic device for depicting the relation of 
eternity to time is to think of the time line as having an  illuminated, 
yellow element indicating the absolute temporal now. Then for things 
in time, only one point on the line is ever yellow, although what point 
is yellow is always changing. For God in the eternal now, however, the 
entire time line is yellow.
An analogy may help here. If there were such a thing as Flatland, as 
described in erwin Abbott’s famous story of that name, then there would 
be more than one mode of spatial existence for sentient beings. There 
would be both the two-dimensional Flatland mode of spatial existence, 
for the story’s sentient squares, and the three-dimensional mode of 
spatial existence, for more familiar sentient creatures. And if Flatland 
were linearly ordered with an absolute middle, there would be an absolute 
Flatland here, which in the Flatland world could be occupied by only one 
Flatlander at a time. Nonetheless, if Flatland were small enough, then, 
with respect to a human observer in the three-dimensional world, all of 
Flatland could be here at once (where the here of Flatland and the here 
of the three-dimensional world are only analogous to one another, not 
identical). And yet it would not follow and it would not be true that all of 
Flatland would be here with respect to any sentient occupant of Flatland. 
So it could be true both that only one sentient square in Flatland could 
be here at once (with respect to the here of Flatland) and also that all 
of Flatland could be here at once (with respect to the here of the three-
dimensional world). The reason for this apparently paradoxical claim is 
that all of Flatland can be encompassed within the metaphysically bigger 
here of the three-dimensional world.
An  analogous point holds with regard to now, on the doctrine 
of eternity. With respect to God in the eternal now, all of time is 
encompassed within the eternal now, in the sense that all of time is eT-
simultaneous with the eternal now.6 Just as the whole Flatland world can 
be here for someone in three-dimensional space, so all of time can be 
6 but it does not follow and is not true that all of time is present with respect to 
anything temporal at any particulartemporal location.
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now for God in the eternal now. Abbott’s Flatland was written in order 
to illuminate the difficulties of thinking oneself up the ladder of being. 
In his story, a sentient square in Flatland makes contact with a sentient 
three-dimensional sphere and struggles to understand what life in the 
three dimensional world could possibly be. The doctrine of eternity has 
the implication that, with respect to time, sentient temporal beings are 
in the position of Flatland’s sentient square as they try to understand 
a metaphysically greater God, whose now is eternal – limitless duration 
without succession – rather than the more limited and more familiar 
temporal now.
The result of God’s eternity is that in respect of time God can be 
more present with regard to a  human person Paula than any other 
contemporary human person Jerome can be. As regards Paula, her 
contemporary Jerome can be present only one time slice after another. 
When Paula is thirty years old, for example, neither her three-year old 
self nor her sixty-year old self are available to Jerome. but eternal God 
is present at once to every time of Paula’s life; none of Paula’s life is ever 
absent or unavailable for God.
PreSeNCe WITH reGArD To SPACe
As for space, mutatis mutandis, analogous things can be said, because 
God is not material, any more than God is temporal.
Aristotle says that a  place contains a  material body only if the 
outermost edge of what is contained and the outermost edge of the 
place coincide.7 If this is right, then since God is not a body and so has 
no outermost edges at all, God cannot be in a place, in the sense that 
the place contains him. (For similar reasons, nothing can be in God in 
this sense; in the Aristotelian sense of ‘place’, God cannot be a place for 
material things.) but although God cannot be present in a place as in 
a container, God can be present at a place.
Presence at a place is a complicated notion. In earlier work,8 Norman 
Kretzmann and I tried to capture this relation in terms of God’s having 
direct and unmediated causal contact with and cognitive access to things 
7 Aristotle, Physics 211 b.
8 eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, ‘eternity, Awareness, and Action’, Faith 
and Philosophy, 9 (1992), 463–82.
35omNIPreSeNCe, INDWellING, AND THe SeCoND-PerSoNAl
at a place.9 I now think, however, that the attempt to capture presence 
at a  place in terms of direct and unmediated cognitive and causal 
connection misses something.
Consider, for example, Homer’s depiction of Zeus. Wherever in 
physical reality he is, Homer’s Zeus has direct and unmediated causal 
contact with the Trojans at the place of the Trojan war and also direct 
and unmediated cognitive access to them. That is, Zeus knows directly 
and immediately what is happening to the Trojans in the fighting with 
the Greeks, say, and he can affect the way the fighting goes just by willing 
it. but Zeus can continue to have such cognitive and causal contact with 
the Trojans at the place of the Trojan war even when he is (as Homer 
sometimes says) having dinner with the ethiopians. While Zeus is 
among the ethiopians, however, he is absent from the place of the Trojan 
War, not present at it.
elsewhere I have argued that what is missing for Zeus in this Homeric 
story can be explained in terms of shared or joint attention.10 It is hard 
to give a good philosophical analysis of joint attention, but easy to give 
examples of it. An infant engages in joint attention when the infant looks 
into the eyes of the mother, who is looking back into the infant’s eyes. 
In adults, joint attention is at least partly a matter of mutual awareness, 
of the sort that prompts philosophical worry about the possibility of 
an unstoppable infinite regress: Paula is aware of Jerome’s being aware 
of Paula’s being of Jerome’s being aware, and so on.11 In shared attention, 
the object of awareness for Paula is simultaneously Jerome and Jerome’s 
awareness of her awareness of his awareness and so on – and the object of 
awareness for Jerome is simultaneously Paula and their mutual awareness.
9 by ‘direct and unmediated’ in this context, I mean only that the cognitive access 
or the causal connection does not have as an  intermediate step the agency of another 
person; I do not mean that there is no intermediary of any sort.
10 See, ‘eternity, Awareness, and Action’ (with Norman Kretzmann), Faith and 
Philosophy, 9 (1992), 463-482.
11 because philosophers take knowledge to be a matter of knowledge that, a more 
common philosophical formulation of mutual knowledge would be in terms of knowing 
that: Paula knows that Jerome knows that Paula knows that Jerome knows, and so on. 
In the case of infants, of course, shared attention cannot be a matter of knowing that 
in this way. For an  interesting study of mutual knowledge in connection with joint 
attention, see Christopher Peacocke, ‘Joint Attention: Its Nature, reflexivity, and relation 
to Common Knowledge’,  in Naomi eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa mcCormack, and 
Johannes roessler, eds., Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds (oxford: 
oxford university Press, 2005), pp. 298–324.
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These attempts at philosophical characterization of joint attention are 
inadequate, and I  offer them only to help prompt intuition about the 
nature of joint attention. roughly put, one can say that joint attention 
is a  kind of second-person experience between two persons who are 
mutually aware of each other.12 Joint attention is most often mediated 
by vision; but it can be mediated by other senses as well. A congenitally 
blind child can share attention with its mother by sound or by touch, 
for example. In the case of an immaterial God, joint attention can occur 
without any mediation by the senses, provided that there is iterated 
mutual awareness. The senses are typically the vehicle for establishing 
joint attention, but they are not essential to it.
between human persons, presence at a  place includes not joint 
attention, but the mere availability for joint attention; and something 
similar can be said about Homer’s human-like Greek gods. In the case of 
Zeus in the story, Zeus is not present at the place of the Trojan war when 
he is having dinner with the ethiopians, because, even though he has 
direct and unmediated cognitive and causal contact with that place and 
the things in it, he is not available to share attention with the Trojans at 
that place. Zeus’s power extends to the place of the Trojan war; but, one 
might say, his face does not. A Trojan might address a prayer to Zeus 
while Zeus is among the ethiopians, in the assurance that Zeus would 
hear it and could immediately answer it by altering the course of the war. 
but it is possible for Greek gods to engage in face-to-face interaction; 
and Zeus is not available for that kind of interaction with anyone at the 
place of the Trojan war while he is away among the ethiopians. For this 
reason, Zeus is not then present at the place of the Trojan war either.
So one ingredient in a  person’s presence at a  place is that person’s 
availability for sharing attention with other persons also present at that 
place. Mutatis mutandis, this point about the connection between shared 
attention and presence at a place applies also to God. God’s having direct 
and unmediated cognitive and causal contact with everything at any 
place is still insufficient for God’s being present at every place. In order 
for God to be present at every place, as Christianity claims God is, it also 
needs to be the case that, for any person at any place who is able and 
willing to share attention with God, God is available to share attention 
with that person.
12 For more discussion of the second-personal and of joint attention, see Chapters 4 
and 6 of my Wandering in Darkness (oxford: oxford university Press, 2010).
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on Christian doctrine, then, the relation of an omnipresent God to 
a human person located in space is analogous to the relation between 
the sentient three-dimensional sphere and the sentient two-dimensional 
square in Abbott’s Flatland. The space that is here for the square is 
much more limited than the space that is here with regard to the sphere, 
which is metaphysically greater than the square. Analogously, although 
only a  limited region of space is here with regard to a  human person 
in a place, for God the entirety of space is here, even in the sense that 
God is available at once to share attention with any human person at any 
location in space.
In this respect, there is parity between God’s relation to space and 
God’s relation to time. In one and the same eternal present, omnipresent 
God is available to share attention with any person at any place in any 
time. because of the way God is present at a place and in a time, for all 
persons, in whatever place and time they are, God is at once present, in 
power and knowledge and also in person.
PreSeNCe beTWeeN HumAN PerSoNS: 
emPATHY, mIND-reADING, AND uNIoN IN loVe
In addition to these kinds of presence at a place or in a time, as between 
human persons yet another kind of presence is possible.
This kind of presence can be understood in relation to mind-reading 
and empathy. We now know much more about empathy than we did 
only a few decades ago, and we understand that one kind of cognition 
afforded by the recently discovered neurological capacities that subserve 
empathy includes mind-reading more generally.
In human beings, mind-reading is the knowledge of persons and 
their mental states.13 because of recent work in neuroscience and 
developmental psychology, especially work on the impairments of 
development among autistic children, we have learned a great deal about 
the neurological systems that make empathy and mind-reading possible 
and the kind of cognition these systems produce. Whatever ties together 
the different clinical signs of all the degrees of autism spectrum disorder, 
13 mind-reading or some analogue of it can be found in species other than human 
beings and also between members of different species, including between human beings 
and other animals; and so the qualification ‘in human beings’ is necessary here.
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the most salient feature of the disorder is an impairment in the cognitive 
capacities necessary for mindreading.14
The knowledge which is impaired for an  autistic child, however, 
cannot be taken as knowledge that something or other is the case. 
A  non-autistic pre-linguistic infant is capable of mind-reading; she 
can know her mother, and to one extent or another she can also know 
some of her mother’s mental states. but she is not capable of knowledge 
that a particular person is her mother. Conversely, an autistic child can 
know that his mother is sad – say, because she has told him so and she 
is a reliable authority on such matters for the child. but the impairment 
14 Among philosophers, there is not one universally accepted understanding of the 
notion of mind-reading. It seems to me to be taken ambiguously, in a way analogous to 
the ambiguity in the notion of perception. The notion of perception can be taken as (i) 
perception, (ii) perception as, and (iii) perceptual belief. To say that max has a perception 
of a cup can be understood to mean:
(i) the cup is an object of perception for max,
(ii) max perceives the cup as a cup,
(iii) max perceives that that is a cup.
The notion of mind-reading seems to me ambiguous in the same way. The reason 
for the ambiguity is that, in ordinary cases in which a cognitive capacity is operating 
normally, it operates as part of a  whole system to give information available to 
consciousness, connected with other information stored in the system, and formulable 
in beliefs. For reasons I have given elsewhere, it seems to me better to take perception 
in sense (ii) than in sense (i) or sense (iii). (See Stump 2003, Chapter 8, especially the 
section on perception.) In this paper, I  will understand mind-reading analogously, in 
sense (ii), rather than sense (i) or sense (iii).
In this respect, I dissent from Alvin Goldman’s use of the term ‘mind-reading’. His 
use of the term is a variant on (iii). He says: ‘by “mindreading” I mean the attribution 
of a mental state to self or other. In other words, to mind-read is to form a judgment, 
belief, or representation that a  designate person occupies or undergoes (in the past, 
present, or future) a specified mental state or experience.’ (Alvin Goldman, ‘mirroring, 
mindreading, and Simulation’, in Jamie Pineda (ed.), Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of 
Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 312) on Goldman’s 
usage, it would not be true to say that autistic children are impaired with respect to mind-
reading, since it is possible for them to form judgments about the mental states of others.
but in order to explain what is impaired in autism, we need a term like ‘mind-reading’ 
in sense (ii). Since ‘mind-reading’ is the term already employed for this purpose by many 
philosophers and researchers on autism, it seems to me better to continue to use the 
term in that way rather than in Goldman’s way. Goldman’s goal is to interpret mind-
reading in such a way as to make the new results in neurobiology compatible with his 
own attempts to understand mind-reading in terms of simulation theory. For arguments 
against Goldman’s position on this score, see Shaun Gallagher’s article in the same 
volume, ‘Neural Simulation and Social Cognition’, pp. 355–71.
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characteristic of autism can leave the child without the knowledge of the 
sadness of his mother. What is impaired for the autistic child is a non-
propositional knowledge of persons and their mental states.
recent research in neuroscience has shown that the capacity for this 
kind of knowledge of persons is subserved at least in part by what is now 
called ‘the mirror neuron system’. The mirror neuron system makes it 
possible for one person to have knowledge of the mental states of another 
person when that knowledge shares something of the phenomenology of 
perception. like the perception of colour, for example, the knowledge of 
persons in mind-reading is direct, intuitive, and hard to translate without 
remainder into knowledge that (but very useful as a basis for knowledge 
that of one sort or another).
Neurons in the mirror neuron system contribute to making the 
knowledge of mind-reading possible because they fire both when one 
does some action oneself or has some emotion oneself and also when 
one sees that same action or emotion in someone else. The point is easier 
to appreciate if we focus on empathy with another person’s pain, which is 
currently also thought to be a result of the cognitive capacities subserved 
by the mirror neuron system.15 When Paula sees Jerome cut himself with 
a knife, she feels his pain, because Paula’s mirror neuron system produces 
in Paula an affective state that has at least some of the characteristics of 
the pain Jerome is experiencing. Paula does not actually suffer physical 
pain resulting from a laceration in her tissues; but, in her empathy with 
Jerome, she has some kind of feeling of pain. only, in Paula, that feeling 
is taken off-line, as it were, because in her it is not connected to tissue 
15 There is a considerable literature on empathy. For a good introduction to some of the 
issues involved, see Alvin Goldman, ‘Two routes to empathy: Insights from Cognitive 
Neuroscience’, in Empathy. Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, ed. Amy Coplan 
and Peter Goldie (oxford: oxford university Press, 2011), pp. 31-44. It is clear that 
there are at least two different kinds of empathy or levels of empathy. one is more nearly 
involuntary and also more coarse-grained. The other is under more voluntary control, 
more fine-grained, and more dependent on past experience and training. The first is 
in play when a person winces as he sees someone else get hurt. The second is engaged 
when someone is deeply involved in reading a novel. It seems clear that there is no sharp 
demarcation between these kinds, but rather a  kind of continuum. The first kind of 
empathy, and any kind of empathy closer to that end of the continuum, is what is at issue 
in this paper. but, in my view, it would be possible to preserve the general point of this 
paper even if it turned out that the cognitive processes at issue required empathy of the 
second kind.
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damage, as it is in Jerome.16 Furthermore, even though in empathy Paula 
feels pain that is her pain, in the sense that the pain is in her and she 
herself feels it, she nonetheless recognizes this pain as Jerome’s pain, 
not hers. The final result of the neural interactions begun by the mirror 
neuron system is that Paula knows that Jerome is in pain; but she knows 
this because, in consequence of the mirror neuron system, she first 
knows Jerome’s pain.17
In general, in mind-reading Jerome, to one extent or another Paula 
will know the action Jerome is doing, the intention which Jerome has 
in doing it, and the emotion Jerome has while doing it. And Paula will 
know these things in Jerome through having herself some simulacrum 
of the mental state in Jerome. Something of Jerome’s mental state will be 
in Paula, but in a different way.
one researcher on mind-reading, Vittorio Gallese, tries to explain 
the relevant neural mechanisms involved in the knowledge of persons 
this way:
[mirror neurons] map ... multimodal representation across different 
spaces inhabited by different actors. These spaces are blended within 
a unified common intersubjective space, which paradoxically does not 
segregate any subject. This space is ‘we’centric ... The shared intentional 
space underpinned by the mirror matching mechanism is not meant to 
distinguish the agent from the observer.18
And he goes on to explain empathy in this way:
16 It is not easy to say precisely what it is for a system to run off-line, but the general 
idea is this. In the case of dreamed motion, the brain’s motor programs for actual physical 
running are off-line in that while these motor programs are firing, they are disconnected 
from the muscles in the legs and so do not produce running in the legs. In the case of 
mind-reading, the brain’s mirror neuron system runs the programs it would run if one 
person were apprehending what the other, observed person is doing; but it runs these 
programs disconnected from those states of will and intellect the observer would have if 
she herself were doing those acts. In this way, she shares in the observed person’s mental 
states but without having them as he has them, in virtue of having her own states of 
intellect and will, not his, even while she feels what she would feel if she were doing what 
he is doing.
17 And, of course, on this basis she also knows that Jerome is in pain. empathic feeling 
of his pain is a reliable ground for knowledge that he is in pain.
18 Vittorio Gallese, ‘“being like me”: Self-other Identity, mirror Neurons, and 
empathy’, in Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science, ed. Susan 
Hurley and Nick Chater (Cambridge, mass.: mIT Press, 2005), p. 111.
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Self-other identity goes beyond the domain of action. It incorporates 
sensations, affect, and emotions. ... The shared intersubjective space 
in which we live from birth continues long afterward to constitute 
a  substantial part of our semantic space. When we observe other 
individuals acting, facing their full range of expressive power (the way 
they act, the emotions and feelings they display), a meaningful embodied 
link among individuals is automatically established. ... [S]ensation and 
emotions displayed by others can also be empathized with, and therefore 
implicitly understood, through a mirror matching mechanism.19
In human mind-reading, there is a sense in which something of the 
thought, affect, or intention in the mind of one person is in the mind 
of another. In the intermingling of minds made possible by the mirror 
neuron system, one person is present to another in virtue of being in that 
other, in a way that the neurobiology of the brain makes possible. This is 
intersubjectivity, or presence with. In mind-reading, one human person 
can be present with another in a way more powerful than mere presence 
at a place or in a time.
The kind of presence to a  person manifested in joint attention is 
broadened by the mind-reading cognitive system. When Paula mind-
reads Jerome, the relevant neural systems give Paula a  direct, quasi-
perceptual awareness of Jerome’s actions, emotions, and intentions. 
And this awareness arises in Paula because in mind-reading Jerome 
she is sharing something of Jerome’s mental states. In this sharing and 
awareness, she is also present with Jerome, with personal presence.
There is a minimal degree of personal presence when Paula winces 
as she sees Jerome slice his finger with his steak knife, even if Jerome 
is unaware that Paula is observing him. This is a  kind of presence of 
one person with another that is possible even if the two people involved 
are strangers to each other or know and heartily dislike each other. For 
example, Paula can wince at Jerome’s pain even while she thinks that his 
suffering that pain serves him right.
but there is a much greater degree of personal presence when two 
people, who are mutually close to each other in a  loving relationship, 
are mutually mind-reading each other in intense shared attention. When 
this kind of second-personal presence occurs, one way to describe the 
connection between the two people in question is to say that they are 
united in love.
19 Gallese, ‘being like me’, p. 111 and p. 114.
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This kind of experience is a staple of romantic literature and poetry. In 
his famous poem ‘The extasie’, John Donne describes such an experience 
between lovers:
our eye-beames twisted, and did thred 
our eyes, upon one double string 
... 
our soules, (which to advance their state 
Were gone out) hung twixt her, and me.
but this kind of being united is also possible between human beings 
in non-romantic or non-erotic relationship as well, as, for example, 
between a mother and her child or between a sick person and her loving 
care-taker.
In what follows, I will argue that both the mind-reading kind of presence 
with a person and the presence between persons united in love is possible 
for God and human persons.
GoD’S PreSeNCe WITH HumAN PerSoNS: 
emPATHY AND mIND-reADING
Since, on orthodox Christian doctrine, God is omniscient, God knows 
all truths; and so God has propositional knowledge (or the divine 
equivalent of propositional knowledge)20 as regards all the mental states 
of all human beings. God knows that Paula is sad or that Jerome is 
disgusted. but it seems that with respect to human persons, God cannot 
have empathy or the mind-reading kind of knowledge. And so it seems 
that one kind of intimate presence between persons, prized by human 
beings, is not possible for God to have with respect to human persons.
When Paula has empathy with Jerome, she feels within herself what 
Jerome feels. but in virtue of having no body, God has no feelings either. 
This is the point of the scholastic doctrine that God is impassible. Strictly 
speaking, a passio, which is the thing an impassible God does not have, 
is a  feeling; and a  feeling at least includes bodily sensations. Nothing 
immaterial can have bodily sensations, and so immaterial God has no 
feelings either, in this sense of ‘feeling’. (This claim is very different from 
20 The doctrine of simplicity complicates any attribution to God, so that God’s 
knowledge of truths may need to be explained in a  way only analogical to human 
propositional knowledge.
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the claim with which it is often confused, namely, the theologically 
unacceptable claim that God has no emotions.)
mind-reading extends to more than knowledge of the feelings of 
another person, but all mind-reading is like empathy in having a shared 
character and a  qualitative feel. When Paula mind-reads Jerome, she 
shares something of Jerome’s mental state in virtue of somehow feeling 
that mental state in herself. A mental state that is Jerome’s is somehow 
also Paula’s and felt by Paula, except that Paula experiences it as Jerome’s, 
rather than as her own. Paula knows Jerome’s intention to hit her, say, 
because her mirror neuron system forms the neural pattern it would form 
if Paula were going to move her arm to hit someone; and so, by feeling it 
within herself, she knows Jerome’s intention to hit. An immaterial God 
cannot form an intention to move his arm to hit, however, because he 
has no arm to move. And so although God can know that Jerome intends 
to hit Paula, it seems that he cannot mind-read Jerome’s intention in the 
direct and intuitive way Paula can.
And the point generalizes. A human psyche is too small and God’s 
mind is too great, one might say, for God to contain human mental states 
within himself in the shared way the mirror neuron system enables as 
between human beings. And so, it seems, the sharing and the presence 
that is the hallmark of the knowledge of persons is ruled out for God.
but appearances are misleading here. In this respect, Christianity has 
special resources because of the doctrine that God became incarnate in 
Christ. The Chalcedonian formula for the incarnate Christ stipulates that 
Christ is one person with two natures. The one person is the second person 
of the Trinity and is thus God, and the two natures are the divine and the 
human. It is one of the consequences of the Chalcedonian formula that 
there are in Christ two minds, one human and one divine, but only one 
person – a divine person – who is the possessor of these two minds.21 The 
far-ranging and significant implications of the Chalcedonian formula can 
be seen by thinking about suffering and death. When Christ suffers and 
dies, he does so in the human nature of Jesus; but the person suffering 
and dying is God. So, while it is theologically correct to say that God 
21 Some people might suppose that this description of Christ is incoherent and 
that philosophical reason can demonstrate that there could be nothing meeting this 
description. In Stump 2003, Chapter 14, I have examined the doctrine of the incarnation 
and attempted to defend it against at least some of the major arguments meant to show 
its incoherence.
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cannot suffer or die in his divine nature, it is not theologically correct 
to say that God cannot suffer or die. on the Chalcedonian formula, and 
validated by later theology, it is theologically correct to say that God 
suffers and that God dies. God can do both, in the human nature he 
assumed.
Furthermore, on the doctrine of eternity, God’s having an assumed 
human nature is not something true of God at some times but not at 
others. It is something characteristic of God always in the limitless 
eternal now. So, on the doctrine of eternity, God is never in the state 
of not having an assumed human nature.22 For this reason, the human 
capacity for suffering is something that is never not characteristic of 
God, in the human nature whose assumption is never absent from God.
For these reasons, God can have empathy with human persons and 
can also mind-read them, since he can use the human mind of the 
assumed human nature to know human persons in the knowledge of 
persons way. He can therefore also be present with human persons in 
this way.
Furthermore, although it is part of orthodox doctrine that in Christ 
the two natures do not mingle, nonetheless, in virtue of the fact that only 
one person has these natures, and that one person is divine, Christ can 
act in such a way as to use elements of both natures in his actions. even 
while acting in his human nature, Christ can use powers that are beyond 
the merely human and that are available to him only through his divine 
nature. For example, acting in his capacity as a human being, Christ does 
miracles; but he is able to do them because in his human actions he can 
harness the divine power over nature.
In the same sort of way, in his human nature, Christ can mind-read 
in ways not possible for mere human persons. When he does, it is the 
human nature doing the mind-reading; but the person doing the mind-
reading is divine and has access to divine power. So Christ has the ability 
to mind-read human beings deeply, or even miraculously, in a way that 
human persons otherwise could not do.23
In fact, since God is present to every time and space, Christ can use 
his human mind and the power of his divine nature to mind-read at 
22 To say this is, of course, not the same as saying that God’s becoming incarnate 
is necessary to him. For Aquinas, for example, God’s eternity and immutability are 
compatible with God’s ability to do otherwise than God does.
23 For one example, see the episode of the woman at the well (John 4:5-29).
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once the entire minds of all human beings at every time and space. To do 
so, Christ has to be willing to open himself up simultaneously to every 
human psyche. When he does so, then at that time all the mental states 
of all human beings will flood his mind, through the extended powers 
provided by his divine nature. In that opening to all human psyches, 
every evil emotion and intention ever had by any human being will then 
be in the human mind of Christ, too, through the divinely empowered 
extended human capacity for mind-reading.
The idea that Christ opens himself at once to this kind of spectacular 
and no doubt harrowing mind-reading is one way of understanding the 
traditional, scripturally based claim that on the cross Christ bore the sins 
of all humankind. on this way of interpreting that scriptural claim, the 
power of God gives the human mind of Christ the more than human 
power of feeling within himself at one and the same time the minds of all 
human persons, with all their sins.24
So, the Chalcedonian formula for the incarnate Christ gives a  way 
of explaining and defending God’s knowledge of persons through 
mind-reading and the presence with persons mind-reading enables. 
Through the human mind of Christ, God can mind-read other human 
beings. And if the mind-reading of Christ can occur in miraculous ways, 
employing the power of God to extend greatly the ordinary human 
capacity for mind-reading, then God can have at once the unilateral 
personal presence brought about in empathy and mind-reading with 
respect to all human persons.
SeCoND-PerSoNAl PreSeNCe: 
uNIoN IN loVe AND INDWellING
The kind of presence God can have with all human persons in 
consequence of the incarnation falls short of the second-personal 
presence obtaining between persons united in love, however. When 
Christ mind-reads miraculously, he does so because of the power of his 
divinely enhanced human capacity for mind-reading. but this kind of 
mind-reading is unilateral, not mutual. And so there is an asymmetry 
that limits personal presence.
24 I have described in detail what such an experience would be, and I have argued 
that it could give rise to the cry of dereliction from the cross in ‘Atonement and the Cry 
of Dereliction from the Cross’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4.1 (Spring 
2012), 1-17.
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It is part of Christian doctrine, however, that when a person Paula 
comes to faith, she opens herself up to God in love. In an act of free will 
that is part of faith, Paula accepts God’s grace and begins a relation of 
mutual love with God. In entering into this relationship, Paula accepts 
not only God’s grace but also God himself.
When Paula comes to faith in this way, the Holy Spirit comes to dwell 
in her. However exactly it is to be understood, on the theological claims 
involving the Holy Spirit, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit puts the mind 
of God within Paula’s psyche, in some sense. because of this strong bond, 
the mutual relationship of love yields maximal second-personal presence 
of God to Paula.
The indwelling Holy Spirit is a common topic of Christian theology,25 
but it is actually not easy to specify what this indwelling comes to. We 
can start by saying what it is not. God’s indwelling in Paula is not merely 
a  matter of God’s having direct and immediate causal and cognitive 
access to Paula’s mind. God has this kind of access to the mind of every 
human being, both with regard to propositional knowledge and also with 
regard to mind-reading. For every person, it is possible for God to know 
the mind of that person with direct and unmediated cognition; it is also 
possible for God to communicate in a direct and unmediated way with 
the mind of that person. And if the interpretation given above of Christ’s 
mind-reading is accepted, then God also has the knowledge of persons 
with regard to all human beings, too. So these kinds of relation between 
God and human beings hold for every human person. The indwelling of 
the Holy Spirit, however, is found only in those people who have faith 
and love of God.
God’s indwelling unites God and a  human person in love, and so 
we might try understanding indwelling as an  analogue to the psychic 
relation between human persons who are united in love. The psychic 
relation between mutually loving human beings is a particularly intimate 
kind of mind-reading accompanied by shared attention between persons 
when those persons are mutually close to each other.26 but this approach 
to explaining the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not quite right either. 
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit is meant to be something ontologically 
more powerful than mutual closeness accompanied by shared attention. 
25 For a helpful discussion seeking to explain the effects of the indwelling Holy Spirit, 
see Aquinas’s SCG IV. 21-22.
26 For discussion and defence of this claim, see Stump 2010, Chapter 6.
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In the Holy Spirit’s indwelling, God himself is somehow within each 
person of faith. Although, as I explained above, immaterial God cannot 
be contained within a  material container, God’s omnipresence does 
include his being somehow within the psyches of those who have faith.
In this connection, it helps to return to Gallese’s attempt to describe 
the kind of cognition that mind-reading is. When Paula mind-reads 
Jerome’s intention to hit her, for example, her mind goes into the 
configuration it would have if she were Jerome and preparing to hit. but 
this configuration is in Paula off-line, that is, not actually connected in 
an active way to her muscles. She has the motor configuration for hitting, 
but on her part no hitting occurs. So, the configuration of Jerome’s 
intention is in Paula; and because it is, it is Paula’s; but it is in Paula as 
Jerome’s intention, and not as hers. This complicated state is what Gallese 
is trying to describe when he says that there is a ‘we-centric’ part of the 
human brain that enables a real sharing of mental states.
Gallese is talking about brain systems in order to make a point about 
mental states. Aquinas makes a  very roughly analogous point about 
the mechanisms of cognition. For Aquinas, when a  person Paula sees 
an  object, such as a  coffee cup, the configuration or form inhering in 
the cup which makes the matter of the cup be a  cup is transferred to 
Paula’s mind. The form that is in the cup is then also in Paula’s mind, only 
in an encoded state. or, as we might say, the configuration of the cup 
is transferred through a certain pattern of firing by Paula’s retinal cells 
to Paula’s visual cortex. In theory, it would be possible for a competent 
neuroscientist, who understands the neural coding involved, to look 
at the configuration in Paula’s visual cortex and infer correctly that 
what is impacting her visual cortex is a  cup. So, in some sense, the 
configuration of the cup is in both the cup and Paula, only in differing 
ways. Analogously, when Paula mind-reads Jerome’s intention, there is 
a  form or configuration in Jerome’s brain that is found also in Paula’s. 
She mind-reads him because she shares this form or configuration with 
him. The same configuration is in each of them, only differently insofar 
as it is off-line in Paula.27
Furthermore, although the configuration of the cup is really in 
Paula’s mind when she sees the cup, that configuration is processed in 
Paula in such a way that, without ceasing to be the form of the cup, the 
27 I am grateful to John Foley, who suggested to me this way of explaining the point 
and its usefulness for understanding the nature of God’s indwelling in a person of faith.
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configuration of the cup is encoded in Paula in such a way as to enable 
Paula to have cognition of the cup. Analogously, when the configuration 
of Jerome’s intention is in Paula’s mind, that configuration is in her mind 
in such a way as to enable Paula to have cognition of Jerome’s intention, 
not hers. So, the configuration of Jerome’s mind is in Jerome’s mind and 
in Paula’s at once, but Jerome feels it as his and Paula feels it as belonging 
to Jerome. It is possible, then, for a person Paula to have within herself, 
biologically and psychologically, something that is her own and yet also 
part of another person Jerome.
Furthermore, it is also possible for Paula to feel this dichotomy in 
a way that is subjectively accessible to her. Paula can consciously identify 
a mental state as within her own mind and yet somehow not hers but 
Jerome’s. It is easiest to see this point in connection with empathy. If 
Paula sees Jerome impale his bare foot on a nail in the garden, she will 
wince with pain. So, something of Jerome’s pain is in Paula; she winces 
because she feels it within herself. but even while she feels this pain in 
herself, she also is conscious that what she feels with pain is Jerome’s pain 
and not her own. She is sharing with Jerome what is Jerome’s.
Neurological research suggests that the brain has multiple systems 
for identifying parts of oneself as one’s own – body parts, thoughts, and 
the self in general.28 If there are brain systems enabling social cognition 
and intersubjectivity, by means of ‘we-centric’ space that enable shared 
mental states, there are also brain systems enabling the distinction 
between self and other. When something goes wrong with these latter 
brain systems, dysfunctional mental conditions can result. For example, 
in consequence of an injury, a patient can suffer the delusion that some 
part of his body is not his own.29 In the view of some researchers, the 
psychological delusion of thought intrusion is yet another result of the 
malfunctioning of these brain systems.30
28 As recent work in metaphysics highlights, there are also criteria for determining that 
a person’s mind is his own, that it belongs to him, in ways hard to specify with precision, 
but crucial for issues of moral responsibility and freedom of will. For a discussion of some 
of the issues, see, for example, my ‘Persons: Identification and Freedom’, Philosophical 
Topics, 24 (1996), 183-214.
29 For a vivid and popular description of such a case, see oliver Sacks, A Leg to Stand 
On (New York: Harper and row, 1984).
30 In Fregoli’s syndrome, a patient has the intractable delusion that he knows familiar 
people when he looks at the faces of strangers. In Capgras syndrome, a patient has the 
intractable delusion that he does not know the people he is looking at when he looks at 
the faces of persons who are in fact familiar to him. For discussion of such syndromes, 
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because of the systems of the human brain for recognizing some 
mental states as one’s own, it is also possible for a person Jerome to have 
a sense of the mind operative in him as not his own but someone else’s.31 
In a  case of this sort, the intersubjectivity of mental states enabled by 
the mirror neuron system and evident in mind-reading transforms from 
a mere psychological sharing to something that is ontological. What is 
in Jerome’s mind is not just another person’s thought or affect, but in fact 
that other person’s mind. ‘Indwelling’ is not a bad word for this kind of 
relationship between minds. It does seem appropriate to say that in such 
a case the other person’s mind indwells Jerome’s mind.
Science fiction is replete with stories in which malevolent non-human 
beings indwell a human mind;32 and folklore has sometimes tended to 
explain certain kinds of mental illness along the same lines.33 Stories 
about such cases are frightening and revulsive because the indwelling 
mind invades the mind of the human person, against his will or at least 
without his consent. Typically, in such cases, the invader has only hatred 
and contempt for its human victim.
see, for example, Sandra blakeslee and Vilayandur ramachandran, Phantoms in the 
Brain (london: Harper Perennial, 2005), chapter 8. both Fregoli’s syndrome and Capgras 
syndrome are a kind of loss, after neurological damage, of the capacity to know something 
as the thing it is. Although these syndromes have been described largely as they affect the 
knowledge of persons, there are also reported cases in which the lost capacity extends to 
the knowledge of familiar things other than persons. So, for example, some researchers 
describe ‘a patient who claimed his actual home was not his “real” home, although he 
recognized that the facsimile home has the same ornaments and bedside items as the 
original’ (Todd Feinberg, John Deluca, Joseph T. Giacino, David m. roane, and mark 
Solms, ‘right-Hemisphere Pathology and the Self: Delusional misidentification and 
reduplication’, in Todd Feinberg and Julian Paul Keenan (eds.), The Lost Self: Pathologies 
of the Brain and Identity (oxford: oxford university Press, 2005), p. 103; see also pp. 105-
106 and pp. 114-125).
31 because this is so, it is a common conceit of science fiction that the mind of one 
sentient creature can be within the mind of another one. The two minds can interact 
within the mind of one person, without either mind losing its identity. In the science 
fiction literature depicting a human being in such a condition, the indwelling mind is 
typically that of an alien. The alien is generally portrayed as smarter and more powerful 
than the human being his mind indwells. but in addition the alien mind is depicted 
as invading the human mind, entering it without the consent of the human being in 
question; and the alien’s purpose is typically either indifferent to the welfare of the human 
being or actively malevolent towards him.
32 robert Heinlein’s The Puppetmasters is an example.
33 If one googles ‘schizophrenia and demon possession’, one will find that this sort of 
belief is still prevalent in some communities today.
50 eleoNore STumP
on the other hand, when two people Paula and Jerome are psychically 
united to one another in love, the interweaving of their psyches occurs 
only with the willingness of each to each. Paula’s psyche is open to Jerome’s 
because Paula wants it to be, and the same is true of Jerome’s psyche with 
respect to Paula. The resulting mutual openness is wanted by each of 
them; and when they have it, it yields gladness and peace. Furthermore, 
insofar as they love each other, each of them wishes for the good of the 
other. And so the vulnerability of the openness of love is acceptable to 
each of them, because of the trust each is rightly willing to place in the 
other.34 Stories of two people united to each other in mutual love in this 
way are a staple of romantic stories, though, of course, mutual love of 
this compelling human kind is found across a  broad range of human 
relationships. Depictions of human persons united in love in a variety of 
relationships is a perennial theme in great literature, and hardly anyone 
is completely immune to its attractions.
In the fullest expression of such uniting in love between Paula and 
Jerome, each of them is as second-personally present to the other as is 
possible between two human beings. but an even more powerful second-
personal presence to a person is possible for God in the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit.
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit requires welcome on the part of the 
human person in the relationship. When a person comes to faith and 
accepts God’s grace in love, then and only then the Holy Spirit comes 
to indwell in the human mind of that person. The Holy Spirit is freely 
accepted by that person, and the union between them is characterized 
by mutual love, freely given and freely accepted.
In this union, what is within the psyche of a human person Jerome 
is not just the thoughts and intentions of God, but God himself. 
Nonetheless, nothing of Jerome’s own individual personhood is lost in 
the process. Jerome’s mind remains his own, and his awareness of his 
mind as his own also remains. Nonetheless, when the Holy Spirit indwells 
in his mind, Jerome will be aware of the Spirit’s mind within his own.
34 It might need to be said that it is possible for two people to love each other but not 
to be united in that love. They might instead love each other in ways that are conflicted 
or mutually self-destructive. but in those cases they are not united to each other, not least 
because each of them, in being conflicted, is divided against himself. For a discussion of 
such cases, see Stump 2010, Chapter 6.
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In consequence, Jerome will have as present as possible, within 
himself, the God who is his beloved. That is why the list of the fruits of 
this union begins with love, joy, and peace – love, because his beloved, 
who loves him, is present to him; joy, because of the dynamic interaction 
with his beloved, who is present to him in second-personal ways; and 
peace, because his heart already has what it most desires, his beloved, 
present to him.35
And so in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, God is present to a person 
of faith with maximal second-personal presence, surpassing even the 
presence possible between two human persons united in mutual love. It 
is a union that makes the two of them one without merging one into the 
other or in any other way depriving the human person of his own mind 
and self.
CoNCluSIoN
So if we think about the notion of presence in all its richness, we can 
see that a  simple consideration of God’s relation to space alone is 
insufficient to elucidate God’s omnipresence. God’s omnipresence is 
a matter of God’s relations to space all right, but to all space at all times 
at once, because omnipresence is an attribute of an eternal God. more 
importantly, because God has a mind and a will, it is possible for God 
to be not just present at a space but also present with and to a person. 
The assumption of a human nature ensures that an eternal God is never 
without the ability to empathize with human persons and to be present 
with them in the way mind-reading enables. And, in the indwelling of 
the Holy Spirit, God can be more powerfully present in love to a human 
person who loves him than any human person could be.
What it is to be omnipresent, then, is to be present in every way to 
everything as much as eternal divine power permits and love allows.36
35 For an excellent discussion of this subject in connection with Aquinas’s ethics, see 
Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and Gifts 
(london and New York: routledge, 2012), especially chapter 4, in which Pinsent likens 
the fruition of second-person relatedness, an ‘abiding in’ the other, to a state of resonance.
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